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STATE FOR ISN AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [IN](#) [AU](#)

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO AUSTRIA ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE

CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR

SUPPLIERS GROUP

REF: STATE 190856

Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso

n: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (SBU) EconPolCouns delivered reftel demarche to Dorothea Auer, Austrian MFA Director (assistant secretary) for Non-Proliferation, and Alexander Kmennt, Auer's DAS-level assistant for nuclear non-proliferation, on October 25.

[1](#)2. (C) Auer and Kmennt were grateful for the detailed description of U.S. policy toward India's nuclear program which we presented. Kmennt said he had attended AA/S Rademaker's presentation as well.

[1](#)3. (C) Kmennt said Austria remained concerned about the consequences of the U.S. initiative for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We stressed that our policy would move India closer to our non-proliferation goals, and both Auer and Kmennt readily agreed that this would be a desirable outcome, if workable.

[1](#)4. (C) Auer and Kmennt said one of the overriding questions for Austria and, as far as they could tell through their contacts, for other NPT states was the question of why the U.S. pursued and concluded the arrangements with India so secretly. The current policy initiative was in contradiction

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with the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, if we were now saying that making decisions by consensus did not matter. We said this was not our position.

[1](#)5. (C) Kmennt noted that China was "very quiet" at the moment. However, there was a good deal of speculation that the U.S. was hoping to elevate India to the status of strategic counterweight to China. In this connection, Kmennt asked, how would we answer a Chinese initiative to create an "exception" for Pakistan? We pointed out that the U.S.-India agreement was not about weapons, but about energy, and had no relevance to the strategic balance in Asia. As concerns Pakistan, we said each country deserved unique treatment. The Indian "exception" would remain one if the international community kept it as such.

[1](#)6. (C) Auer and Kmennt expressed doubt about our ability to

separate the military and civilian sides of India's nuclear program. We noted that the agreement with India includes safeguards, and we would work to implement them as part of the agreement.

17. (C) Kmennt asked about the sequencing of the commitments in the agreement, pointing out that India would deliver on its obligations only after the U.S. and the international community had done several important steps. What would prevent India from reneging on its agreement after taking what it could? We said both sides had taken the negotiations seriously, and we concluded the agreement in the expectation that the Indians would deliver on their promises.

18. (C) Auer and Kmennt thanked us for our presentation. They said the topic would occupy Austria during its EU Presidency in January-June 2006, and they asked that we remain in contact on progress on implementation of the agreement. This would also be a topic for Troika meetings in the course of the Austrian presidency.

van Voorst